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ON CHARTING A COURSE THROUGH
THE MATHEMATICAL QUAGMIRE:
THE FUTURE OF BAKER V. CARR
Jerold Israel*

T

HE Tennessee reapportionment decision, Baker v. Carr,' has

been popularly characterized as one of the "very few judicial decisions which have fundamentally reshaped our constitutional system."' 2 Newspaper and magazine commentators generally
have predicted that the decision of last March is likely to "change
the course of our history" by producing a drastic alteration in the
balance of power on the state political scene.3 While this end may
be desirable,4 any such estimate of the future impact of the Baker
decision, at least insofar as its legal consequence is concerned, 5
seems not only premature but somewhat exaggerated. The future
significance of this decision will ultimately depend upon the
0 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 Burnham, One Man, One Vote, 76 COMMONWEAL 145 (1962); Note, 15 VAND. L. R~v.
985 (1962). See, e.g., Ascoli, Reporter's Notes, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 12: "a
decision as momentous as the greatest the Supreme Court has handed down . . . . One
of those decisions endowed with the enduring quality that is the stuff of history";
Politics, Not as Usual, 76 COMONWEAL 339 (1962): "may well be ... one of the handful
of Court rulings which directly changed the course of U.S. history"; Lewis, Decision on
Reapportionment Points Up Urban-Rural Struggle, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 4, p. 3,
col. 1. "Historic" and "momentous" were the adjectives widely applied to the decision.
The Baker case has frequently been compared in importance to Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Note, 15 VAD. L. Rlv. 985-86 (1962); Newsweek,
April 9, 1962, p. 29.
3 Politics, Not as Usual, supra note 2. See, e.g., Newsweek, supra note 2, at pp. 29-30;
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 4, p. 11, col. 3 (quoting from various other newspapers);
Reston, Rural Areas Facing Loss of Political Dominance, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1962,
p. 1, col. 6; p. 21, col. 1. See also Lewis, supra note 2. But see Bickel, The Great Apportionment Case, New Republic, April 9, 1962, p. 13. The change in the political structure
was not expected overnight, however. The commentators have generally noted that there
would be "a long, hard fight" in the courts, with appeals and delays, before the decision's
impact would be felt on the local political scene. See Politics, Not as Usual, supra; Time,
April 6, 1962, p. 17. Subsequent litigation, however, has caused some commentators to
suggest that the changes might well occur much earlier than originally predicted. See,
e.g., Politics,Not as Usual, supra.
4 See BAKRi, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL PowER 15-32 (1955); Hacker, Message
on the Status of the States, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1962, § 6 (Magazine), pp. 15, 27; Lukas,
Barnyard Government in Maryland, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 31.
5 It is entirely possible that Baker might have a practical significance far beyond its
legal importance. The decision may give rise to reapportionment schemes which would
not be constitutionally required. But see text at note 155 infra. The concern here, however, will be primarily with the impact that Baker will have insofar as the application
of the equal protection clause will invalidate present legislative apportionment.
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manner in which the Supreme Court extricates itself from what
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has so colorfully described as the "mathematical quagmire" 6 of determining what constitutes invalid state
legislative apportionment. And, as the following discussion hopefully will demonstrate, the path to be charted through that quagmire may be far narrower than most commentators and many
lower courts have anticipated.
I.

THE CouRT's HOLDING

In order to evaluate the potential repercussions of the Baker
decision, it is necessary at the outset to establish precisely what
the Court decided and, more importantly, what remains for future
decision. The express holding of the majority opinion7 was that
a voter's claim of denial of equal protection resulting from allegedly discriminatory apportionment of a state legislature presented a justiciable claim which can be decided by a federal court.'
Implicit in this ruling, one would gather, is the further premise
that the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection
of the laws may be violated by a scheme of legislative apportionment which creates inequalities of individual voting power through
differences in the population of the voting districts represented by
state legislators. 9 Together these principles constitute the entirety
of the Baker holding. Nowhere does the Court indicate, by dictum
or otherwise, what standards might be used in determining the
validity of an apportionment scheme which creates such inequalities.
Since this interpretation of the Baker decision-particularly
of what was not decided-serves as the foundation for most of
the following discussion, it is important to consider its justification.
For, although it is almost unanimously advanced by those who
6 369 U.S. at 268 (dissenting opinion).

7 The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined in by six members
of the Court. 369 U.S. at 187, 241, 251, 265. Three concurring Justices, Douglas, Clark,
and Stewart, wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each
wrote dissenting opinions in which the other joined. Justice Whittaker did not participate.
8 The Court rejected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction over such a claim, or,
if there was jurisdiction, it could not be exercised because the claim presented a "political
question." 369 U.S. at 198-237. In addition, the petitioners, as voters, were found to have
the proper standing to challenge the legislative apportionment on equal protection
grounds. 369 US. at 204-08.
9 See 369 U.S. at 237; Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.B.A.J. 711, 712 (1962).
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have commented upon the decision,1" this restricted view of the
Court's holding cannot be accepted without providing a satisfactory explanation of certain language in the majority's opinion.
True, the majority opinion does not contain any lengthy
discussion of the criteria for determining what types of legislative
malapportionment might constitute a denial of equal protection.
In fact, the Court's only direct reference to this subject was by
way of rejoinder to the argument that the petitioners' claim presented a "political question" because of the purported absence of
"judicially manageable standards for judging" reapportionment
cases. The majority simply stated:
"Judicial standards under the Equal Protection clause are
well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts
since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but is simply arbitrary and capricious
action."'"
Thus, the Court did no more than accept, in slightly variant
form, the conventional equal protection distinction between permitted "rational classification" (discrimination justified by reasonable differences) and proscribed "invidious discrimination"
(discrimination not reasonably justifiable and therefore "arbitrary"). 2 The Court's indication that this distinction was applicable to claims in the reapportionment setting reveals little about
the precise standards to be employed in ascertaining what constitutes invalid apportionment. The crucial factor of what constitutes a "rational" ground for discrimination must vary with the
subject matter,'3 and the specific criteria for determining "ration10 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 2, at 147; Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker
v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. R.Ev. 829, 833 (1962); Lewis, Reapportionment is Gaining Momentum,
N.Y. Times, June 17, 1962, § 4, p. 8, cols. 1-5; Aug. 20, 1962, p. 22, col. 1; Newsweek,
supra note 2, at p. 32 (quoting Professor Freund). This view of the case is implicit in
most discussions by the lower courts. For explicit acceptance by the judiciary, see Lisco
v. McNichols, U.S.L. WEEK 2107-08 (D. Colo., Aug. 10, 1962); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, col. 4, Anne Arundel
County Cir. Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, No. 385, Chittenden
County, Vt. Sup. Ct., July 20, 1962, p. 12. But see authorities cited note 14 infra.
11 369 U.S. at 226.
12 Cf. Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457, 463-64 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
13 See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334, 339-40
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ality" in the apportionment context are mentioned nowhere in
the opinion.
A pronouncement of applicable criteria is not, however, the
only means by which an opinion might describe what constitutes
an arbitrary apportionment scheme. Establishment of a standard
of "invidious discrimination" is also possible by means of the illustrations provided by holdings that particular apportionment
schemes are or are not invalid. It is the possible use of precisely
this technique which makes troublesome the generally accepted
conclusion that the Court in Baker gave no indication of the types
of apportionment schemes which must be constitutionally rejected.
Both Mr. Justice Clark, who concurred in the majority opinion,
and Mr. Justice Harlan, who dissented, understood the majority
opinion to hold, albeit sub silentio, that, as described in the complaint, the Tennessee scheme of apportionment violated the equal
protection clause. 14 Their interpretation apparently rested upon
the fact that the majority opinion held not only that the lower
court had jurisdiction of the petitioners' claim that inequalities
of representation in the Tennessee apportionment scheme rendered it unconstitutional, but also that such a claim, as spelled
out in the complaint, constituted "a justiciable cause of action
...upon which [petitioners] would be entitled to relief."' 5 This
latter portion of the Court's holding was construed, by Justices
Clark and Harlan, to limit the lower court's task upon remand
solely to determining whether petitioners' factual allegations describing the legislative apportionment were true. 5
(1959); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1947).
14 369 U.S. at 251, 261, 331. See also Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 845 (M.D. Tenn.
1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 239, 116 N.VW.2d 350, 380 (1962) (opinion of Justice
Souris); and Note, 15 VAND. L. Rxv. 985, 989 (1962), which also adopt this view of the
majority's holding. But see Sobel v. Adams, Civil No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962,
pp. 5-6; Lisco v. McNichols, U.S.L. WaiK 2107-08 (D. Colo., Aug. 10, 1962). Toward the
end of his opinion, Justice Harlan criticized the majority for its "failure to come to
grips with the question whether the complaint states a claim cognizable under the
Federal constitution ..
3G9
6.."
U.S. at 38. This presumably refers to the majority's failure
to give any explanation for its holding that the Tennessee apportionment was unconstitutional rather than a contradiction of his earlier statement indicating his agreement with
Justice Clark that the majority had so held.
15 369 U.S. at 197-98. This holding was stressed by Justice Clark. 369 U.S. at 251. See
also Justice Harlan's opinion at 369 U.S. 186, 330, 388. It has also been relied upon by
others who accept the Clark-Harlan view. See authorities cited note 14 supra.
16 See 369 U.S. at 267. Although Justice Harlan did not discuss the point, this con-
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Analyzed in terms of the customary rules of procedure, the
holding that the complaint stated a proper "cause of action" certainly would appear to indicate that the majority considered the
Tennessee apportionment scheme, as described in the complaint,
to be invalid. A holding that a complaint will not be dismissed17
"for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"'
ordinarily sustains its legal sufficiency, that is, establishes that the
plaintiff is entitled to appropriate relief if he can prove the alleged
facts."8 However, a close reading of the majority opinion in Baker
demonstrates that its holding should not be taken in such a customary sense. The Court's holding that a "justiciable cause of
action is stated upon which [petitioners] would be entitled to relief" was expressly made "in the light of the district court's treatment of the case."' 19 The three-judge lower court had dismissed
not only for lack of jurisdiction but also for "failure to state a
claim." 20 As viewed by the majority, the lower court's opinion
relied upon the second ground, not because of any position taken
upon the constitutionality of Tennessee's legislative apportionment, but because of confusion as to whether Colegrove v. Green2 '
and other decisions thought to be controlling22 were based on a
lack of federal jurisdiction of claims challenging the constitutionality of legislative apportionment schemes or a discretionary refusal to exercise existing jurisdiction because the subject matter
was considered inappropriate for judicial determination. 23 In reversing on this point of justiciability, the Court merely phrased
its conclusion in terms similar to those used by the lower court.
It certainly does not seem likely from the tenor of the majority
opinion that the Court intended to go beyond reversal of the
clusion as to the issues open on remand is the natural implication of his view of the
majority's holding. The lower court apparently also shared this view of the remand.
Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 344 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). See also Scholle v. Hare, 367
Mich. 176, 238, 116 N.W.2d 350, 379 (1962); Note, 15 VAND. L. REv. 985, 998 (1962).
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
18 See I MooRE, FEDERAL RuLEs § 12.08 (1961).
19 369 U.S. at 197-98.
20 369 U.S. at 196, quoting from the order of dismissal in the lower court. See also the
lower court opinion at 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
21 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22 In addition to Colegrove, the lower court relied upon a series of subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, mostly per curiam, which relied upon Colegrove. See 179 F. Supp. at 826
(collecting the cases).
23 369 U.S. at 197-98.
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lower court's ruling to hold that not only were claims of denial
of equal protection from legislative malapportionment properly
to be considered by federal courts, but also that the allegations
of fact in the complaint made out such a denial of constitutional
rights.2 4 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the lower
court did not indicate any opinion upon, and certainly did not
give any serious consideration to, the constitutional merits of the
petitioners' claim. 5 It has been the policy of the Court in the
reapportionment context, as evidenced by two recent decisions,26
to refuse to consider any aspect of the merits of the complaint
until the lower court has ruled thereon. Thus, despite a somewhat unfortunate use of language, the majority opinion apparently
did not decide that the legislative apportionment of Tennessee was
2
unconstitutional. T
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the view generally advanced that the Baker decision neither decided nor indicated what
constitutes unconstitutional apportionment should be sustainable.
Precise guidelines for ascertaining what constitutes "invidious discrimination" in legislative apportionment were suggested neither
by the Court's general commentary on equal protection standards
nor by its ruling on the petitioners' complaint. Those state court
judges who have suggested, without explanation, that the majority
opinion in the Baker decision contains some such standard have,
one suspects, read into that opinion their own desire to attribute
responsibility for a controversial decision to the Supreme Court
24 Also, the other concurring opinions do not suggest such a broad holding. See 569
U.S. at 241, 265-66.
25 See Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). The lower court did note
that it agreed with "the plaintiffs' argument that the legislature of Tennessee is guilty of
a clear violation of the state constitution and of the rights of the plaintiffs." Id. at 828.
There is some question as to whether this reference to plaintiffs' "rights" was to their
federal rights or their state rights. The Government had assumed the latter as it argued
that the lower court had not considered the merits. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, p. 20, Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186 (1962). In any event, it is clear the court gave
no serious consideration to the merits.
26 WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962) (per curiam); Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S.
429 (1962) (per curiam).
27 Even if the court had so held, there would be some question as to exactly what
this meant. Arguably the mere allegation in the complaint that the apportionment was
"arbitrary" would be enough to sustain it against a motion to dismiss. However, as
Justice Harlan noted, the facts alleged in the complaint should prevail over any inconsistent legal conclusions, so that a decision upholding the claim would have been based
upon the sufficiency of those facts rather than a mere allegation of arbitrariness. See
Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 118 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1940).
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by playing the role of the28lower court dutifully following detailed
instructions from above.
II.

THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Because of the Court's failure to prescribe any standards for
determining what constitutes "invidious discrimination" in legislative apportionment, the ultimate significance of the Baker decision is still uncertain. 9 Although there are many suits pending,3 0
a sufficient number of cases have been decided so as to provide
some suggestion as to the standard which might eventually evolve. 3
28 See Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, 668 (Md.
1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 305 (R.I. 1962) (concurring opinion). Compare
Lisco v. McNichols, U.S.L. WEEK 2107-08 (D. Colo., Aug. 10, 1962).
29 Another question left unanswered by the opinion is whether a suit challenging a
state's legislative apportionment could be dismissed for "want of equity" if the lower
court finds that there is no effective remedy for the alleged constitutional violation. See
Note, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1010, 1017 (1962). The majority opinion does not reject
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), insofar as it is based on this ground. 369 U.S.
at 233-36. Also, the Government in its brief took the position that the lower court could
always dismiss the Tennessee case if it found all available remedies inappropriate. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 21, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). To date,
however, lower courts have had little difficulty devising a remedy even in the most
difficult circumstances. See Baker v. Can, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Sweeney
v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (RI. 1962). Moreover, this has been achieved without using the two
remedies most likely to be attacked as inappropriate-an election at large, or direct reapportionment by the court based on its own plan (rather than one devised by the legislature). But cf. Sims v. Fink, Civil Case No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962; Scholle v.
Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 192, 116 N.W.2d 350, 357 (1962); N.Y. Times, July 22, 1962, p. 1,
col. 2; p. 46, col. 5. It therefore seems unlikely that the situation will arise where a lower
court will find it desirable to dismiss for "want of equity." But cf. Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civil No. 3540, W.D. Wis., Aug. 14, 1962.
30 See Reapportionment Efforts at High Pitch, 51 NAaTONAL CiVic REv. 441-48 (1962);
N. Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1962, p. 28, col. 3; Oct. 21, 1962, p. 71, col. 1. Few recent court
decisions have given rise to as much litigation in so short a time as Baker. Id., May 14,
1962, p. 1, col. 2.
31 Lisco v. McNichols, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2107-08 (D.C. Colo., Aug. 10, 1962); WMCA,
Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WrK 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962); Sobel v. Adams, Civil No.
182-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962; Moss v. Burkhart, Civil No. 9130, D. Okla., June 19, 1962,
Aug. 3, 1962; Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civil No. 3540, W.D. Wis., Aug. 14, 1962, and
Report of the Special Master, July 25, 1962; Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn.
1962); Lein v. Sathre, 205 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.D. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp.
248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Stein v. General
Assembly, 31 U.S.L. WrK 2075 (Colo. Sup. Ct. July 6, 1962); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d
241 (Idaho 1962); Harris v. Shanahan, No. 90746, Dist. Ct., Shawnee County, Kan., July 26,
1962; Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, decided on remand, Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, cols. 3-6, Anne Arundel County Cir.
Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350
(1962); Levitt v. Attorney Gen., 179 A.2d 286, rehearingdenied, 180 A.2d 827 (N.ki. 1962);
Levitt v. Maynard, 31 U.S.L. WrE 2060 (N.H. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1962); Sweeney v. Notte,
183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, No. 385, Chittenden County, Vt. Sup. Ct.,
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Lower courts generally, as well as most commentators, have agreed
upon either one or the other of two general standards for determining what apportionment inequalities constitute "invidious
discrimination."32 Under the first of these standards, any deviation
from what is described as "practical" numerical equality of individual representation would be constitutionally invalid.3 s The
second standard, while basically adhering to a principle of numerical equality of representation, would permit certain deviations-limited but substantial-from "practical equality" where
those deviations are based upon "rational" justifications. It is
this second, more flexible standard which has received the greater
favor of the courts.3 A discussion of both standards is in order,
however, before considering whether and to what degree judicial
support of either is justified.
A. PracticalEquality of Individual Representation
The "practical equality" standard is founded upon the socalled "one man-one vote" principle-that every man is equal
and therefore every man's vote should carry the same weight in
the election of legislative representatives. 3 Any inequality in votJuly 20, 1962. See also Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sanders
v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga.), prob. juris. noted, 370 U.S. 921 (1962). [Note: Some
of the above cases which appeared in the reporters after the printer had set these
footnotes include: Lisco, 208 F. Supp. 471; Sims, 208 F. Supp. 431; WMCA, Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 368; Sobel, 208 F. Supp. 316; Moss, 207 F. Supp. 885.]
32 Bickel, The Great Apportionment Case, New Republic, April 9, 1962, p. 13, appears
to be the one exception to this general consensus among commentators.
33 The words "practical" and "substantial" are generally used interchangeably. See,
e.g., Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 42, 57-60, 104 N.W.2d 63, 84, 92-94 (1960); the dissenting opinion of Justice Smith was sustained on reconsideration of the case at 367 Mich.
176, 116 N.W.2d 350. The phrase "substantial equality" may not always be used by courts
in the sense of "practical equality," however. On occasion, it is used in a context suggesting
that standard which is described here as "substantial equality" altered by certain "rational"
deviations. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5 (1962), and note 40 infra.
34 See note 45 infra.
35 "One man-one vote" refers not merely to the equality of the number of votes cast
per individual, but also to the weight attributed to the individual's vote. The concept
of "one man-one vote" includes equal voting power as well as equal suffrage. See BArER,
RuRAL VERsus URBAN PoLicAL PowER 5-6 (1955); Burnham, supra note 2. Of course,
perfect equality of voting power probably requires a system of proportional representation
applied to a state-wide election. As used here, however, equal voting power means merely
that equality which results when there are an equal number of people within the various
state election districts so that each legislator represents the same number of constituents.
Ibid. This definition, in turn, must be further refined by noting that numerical equality
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ing power produced by a principled departure from this concept
is considered to constitute arbitrary discrimination. Even under
this standard, however, one should not expect that there must
be perfect per capita equality of representation. The fourteenth
amendment does not require that the principles of equal protection be applied with "mathematical exactness."3 6 Furthermore,
state court decisions enforcing equality of representation provisions in state constitutions have insisted only that legislators represent a "more or less" equal number of constituents so that each
man's vote will have "approximately" the same weight.3 7
The "approximate" nature of the equality of representation
even under the "practical equality" test should be stressed. Unless
voting districts are to be constantly changed without consideration of natural boundaries, it is fortunate indeed to achieve anything less than a twenty-five percent difference in individual
voting power 3 -- even without considering the further disparity resulting from population shifts between apportionments. This can
be easily illustrated by the following example. Assume that a state
has four major population centers, each traditionally serving as
of constituencies may be measured in terms of total adult population, that portion of the

population eligible to vote, those who have registered to vote, or those who actually voted

in previous elections. All four bases of calculation either are used or have been suggested
for use. See BAKER, STATE CONsTrruTIONs: REAPPORTIONMENT 6-7 (1960); Romani, Legislative Representation, in SALErrNT IssuEs OF CONSTrrUONAL REvISION 34, 36 (Wheeler ed.
1961); Harvey, Reapportionments of State Legislatures-Legal Requirements, 17 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 364, 366 (1952). All are compatible with the practical implementation of
the "one man-one vote" concept. See Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga.
1962); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, 668 (Md. 1962);
BAKER, STATE CONSTIrUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT, supra, at 6-7. But see Romani, supra, at
36-37.
36 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 260 (1962) (concurring opinion). See Allied Stores, Inc.
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 540 (1942).
37 See, e.g., People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 463-66, 476-82, 40 N.E.
307, 310-11 (1895); Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 192-200, 32 N.E. 836, 840-43
(1892); Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 6-8, 52 N.W. 944, 946 (1892); People ex rel.
Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 498-506, 31 N.E. 921, 928-31 (1892); State ex rel. Bowman v.
Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932).
38 The English experience is illustrative. The 1944 Redistribution Act was based on
the principle of "representation by population" with respect for local geographical
boundaries as far as practicable. Nevertheless the act required only that districts should
not deviate more than 25% from the electoral quota (population divided by number of
districts). However, even the 25% standard was found "too restrictive." See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 304-05 (1960) (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter). See also cases cited
in note 34 supra.
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the nucleus of a voting district. Assume also that the state constitution provides for six legislators and that the state population
is 600,000, so that ideally each legislator should represent 100,000
people. District A has 120,000 people, district B has 130,000
people, district C has 170,000 people, district D has 180,000 people. Can the state under the "practical equality" standard "reasonably" apportion two representatives each to districts C and D
and one representative apiece to A and B? If so, the legislator
from B will represent over half again as many people (130,000)
as a single legislator from district C (85,000).19 Yet, the concept
of figuring to the nearest whole number is not uncommon. 40 It
may be possible, of course, to reduce the differences in voting
power by creating floterial districts.41 In this case, for example,
one representative apiece may be apportioned to each of the four
districts individually, and the two remaining representatives might
be elected from two floterial districts, one composed of districts
A and D and the other of districts B and C. But then again districts A and D, or B and C, may not be contiguous, or there may
be regional differences which would not make the sharing of a
representative feasible. Moreover, it seems likely that the broad
discretion left to a legislature even under a "practical equality"
standard includes the power to reject completely the use of floterial
districts. Also, the alternative of redefining the state voting districts so that the population of each would be an even quotient
of 100,000 seems infeasible if the present boundaries are both
traditional and natural. 42 A court could not reasonably require
39 Also, under this distribution, 58% of the population would elect 67% of the legislature. Of course, in the usual situation there would probably be many districts close to
the ideal population per representative so that while there may be a 50% deviation in
population of particular districts, it would still take at least 45% of the population to
elect 50% of the legislature.
40 See, e.g., recent statutes cited in Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (MJ).Tenn.
1962); Sobel v. Adams, Civil No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962, p. 2. See also Willcox,
Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 290, 291-93 (1952).
See generally Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 8, 161 A.2d 705, 708 (1960)
(listing the various methods of dealing with fractions in apportionment).
41 On the functioning of "combination" or "floterial" districts, see BoYD, PATTrENs
OF APPORTIONMENT 16 (1962). Another method of equalizing individual voting power is
to vary the weight of a legislator's vote according to the comparative size of the population of the district he represents. See Tyler, What Is Representative Government?, New
Republic, July 16, 1962, p. 15.
42 See In the Matter of Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 105-14, 33 N.E. 827,
830-33 (1893).
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the state to take one part of a town and include it in a voting
district dominated by another town miles away, solely for the
purpose of avoiding that inequality in representation which
results from the rounding off of fractions. In fact, to require redistricting in such situations would only encourage political gerrymandering. Thus, in summary, even under the standard of "practical equality" of representation the actual result may be far from
the ideal of the "one man-one vote" principle.
Even with this concession to the pragmatic, "practical equality"
of representation as a standard for judging the constitutionality
of legislative apportionment has been more talked about than
acted upon. Although this concept was pressed by many newspaper and magazine commentators as the eventual progeny of the
Baker decision, 43 at least two of the Justices who concurred in the
majority opinion and both of those dissenting indicated in separate opinions that they would not accept such a standard. 44 Moreover, this standard has fared little better in other courts, state or
federal.45 In fact, only one or possibly two courts have accepted
the "practical equality" standard as a requirement inherent in the
equal protection clause. Its principal judicial support is derived
from the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Scholle v. Hare,4
and even there it is not entirely clear that the standard was
adopted.
43 See Lewis, Decision on Reapportionment Points up Urban-Rural Struggle, N.Y.
Times, April 1, 1962, § 4, p. 3, col. 1; Note, 15 VAND. L. REV. 985, 986 (1962). See also
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 46, col. 6.
44 See the opinion of Justice Clark, 369 U.S. at 252-53, 253 n.4, 258 (1962); the
opinion of Justice Stewart, 369 U.S. at 265-66; the opinion of Justice Frankfurter, 369
U.S. at 266, 301-24; the opinion of Justice Harlan, 369 U.S. at 334, 336, 345-48. The
opinion of Justice Douglas is rather confusing on this point. At one place in his opinion
he notes that "universal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting." 369 U.S. at
244-45. Yet later he suggests the goal of "substantial equality" of representation, 369 U.S.
at 250 n.5. See also his dissents in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950); MacDougall v.
Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948).
45 See Lisco v. McNichols, U.S.L. WEEK 2107-08 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 1962); WMCA, Inc.
v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. W= 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962); Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341
(M.D. Tenn. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sims v. Frink,
205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656 (Md. 1962); Levitt v. Attorney
General, 179 A.2d 286 (N.H. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
46 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.V. 350 (1962), stay granted pending disposition of petition
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1962, p. 9, col. 1.
The case was originally decided in favor of the Secretary of State, 360 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d
63, but was remanded by the Supreme Court "for further consideration in the light of
Baker v. Carr," 369 U.S. at 429.
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The Michigan court held invalid a state constitutional provision apportioning the state senatorial seats among enumerated
districts. The Michigan lower house is apportioned on a population basis, 47 but the apportionment of the senate by geographical
area clearly did not provide for anything approaching per capita
equality of representation. The two opinions for the majority
rejected the senatorial apportionment because "the arrangement
of the [voting] districts was made without any discernible or conceivable basis, let alone upon any rational basis" 4 -a ground which
is consistent with other possible equal protection standards besides
"practical equality" of representation. 49 However, the court seemingly adopted the "practical equality" standard when it warned the
legislature that future apportionment of the state senate would
certainly be invalid if any legislator had a constituency twice the
size of another. Thus, one of the opinions stated:
"When a legislative apportionment provides districts having
more than double the population of others, the constitutional
range of discretion is violated. This is not to say less than
47 The one hundred and ten seats in the Michigan House of Representatives are
apportioned among election districts which must "contain as nearly as may be an equal
number of inhabitants." However, the "representative districts" also must "consist of convenient and contiguous territory," with "no township or city ... divided in the formation
of a representative district, except ... when a city is composed of territory in more than
one county .... " Moreover, each representative district is "entitled to a separate representative when it has attained a population equal to a moiety of the ratio of representation" (total population divided by one hundred). MiCH. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1908). Of
course, these latter provisions bar perfect implementation of the basic population standard.
See Romani, Legislative Representation, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 34,
37-38 (Wheeler ed. 1961). The departure is not so significant, however, as to violate a
"practical equality" test. Cf. BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTONS: REAPPORTIONMENT 7-8 (1960).
But cf. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1962, p. 28, col. 6 (letter to the editor from counsel for
petitioner in the Scholle case).
48 367 Mich. at 242-43, 116 N.W.2d at 381 (concurring opinion of Justice Souris).
There was no one opinion in which all members of the four-man majority concurred.
Justices Souris and Kavanaugh each wrote an opinion in which one other member of the
majority concurred.
49 Moreover, both opinions contain certain other statements which might indicate
that such non-population factors as area might be considered in apportionment. See
Justice Kavanaugh's opinion, at 367 Mich. 186, relying on his earlier opinion which
seemed to suggest apportionment might be justified by a "rational correlation . . . [to]
representation of area, political units, interests, population, or any combination of these."
360 Mich. at 40, 104 NAW.2d at 83. See also Justice Souris' opinion at 367 Mich. at 242,
116 N.W.2d at 381, where he claims to leave open the question of "whether a State may,
as a matter of State policy, have as its objective in classifying its people into electoral
districts, the dilution of the voting strength of some in favor of others." But see his
immediately preceding comments.
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such 2-to-i ratio is constitutionally good. It is to say only that
peril ends and disaster occurs when that line is crossed."5
This test of a two-to-one ratio or less, taken from state cases
interpreting a state requirement of "practical equality," 51 certainly appears to impose that same standard as a requirement of
the equal protection clause.5 2 The Michigan court's suggestion
that it might permit deviation from absolute numerical equality
of representation up to the point of a two-to-one ratio does not
indicate otherwise. In a state such as Michigan, where the state
constitution prohibits the division of a county in drawing an election district,5 3 something approaching a two-to-one deviation in
numerical representation for a small portion of the electorate
may be as practical an application of the one man-one vote principle as can reasonably be achieved.54
The majority opinions of the Michigan court relied in large part
on the political theory behind the one man-one vote concept to
justify the imposition of a two-to-one ratio as the outer limit for
inequality of representation. Thus, the justices quoted with approval such earlier judicial statements as one that equality of
50 367 Mich. at 188-89, 116 N.W.2d at 355. This requirement was accepted by all the
members of the majority. See 367 Mich. at 243, 116 N.W.2d at 382.
51 See Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906); Giddings
v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892). The test was also supported by reference to
the statement in the dissenting opinion in MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948),
that a "State law giving some citizens twice the vote of other citizens ... would lack that
equality which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Id. at 288.
52 It has been argued that the Michigan court imposed this standard solely as a
requirement of the 1908 state constitutional provision, which was resuscitated once the
1952 provision was rejected as unconstitutional. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1962, p. 28, col. 6
(statement by counsel for petitioner Scholle). However, the court clearly states at various
points that this standard is a requirement of the federal equal protection clause. Thus,
Justice Kavanaugh summarizes the majority holding as follows: "We hold in final summation that the Fourteenth Amendment and our own corresponding pledge of the
protection of equal laws . . .do require that the senatorial districts of Michigan be so
arranged as to be consistent with the foregoing maximum 2-to-I ratio." 367 Mich. at
189-90, 116 N.W.2d at 355-56. It should be noted that this two-to-one requirement was
derived from an opinion interpreting the fourteenth amendment as well as opinions
interpreting the state constitution. See note 51 supra.
53 MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (1908) prohibits the creation of a senatorial district which
includes portions of two different counties. See Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447,
108 N.W. 749 (1906). The majority in Scholle treated the 1908 provision as operative once
the present provision, adopted in 1952, was found invalid. See 367 Mich. at 186, 243,
116 N.W.2d at 354, 383.
54 See In the Matter of Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 112-14, 33 N.E.
827, 832-33 (1893); State ex rel. Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932).
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' And it was in
voting "lies at the basis of our free government."55
the light of these statements that the majority concluded that the
equal protection clause requires approximate equality of individual voting power in order to "ensure that reasonably uniform right
of governmental representation which came to life by impact of
the Declaration of Independence."5
57 an
A similar rationale was expressed in Moss v. Burkhart,
Oklahoma federal district court decision in which, when the opinion is read in the light of the decree, it may be argued that the
court adopted the "practical equality" standard as a requirement
of the equal protection clause.5 8 In the Moss decision the court
concluded that numerical equality of representation was the basic
requirement of equal protection "because under our democratic
institutions and republican form of government, the suffrage right
of the individual is, and must be the keystonei-the common denominator, of self-government."59
This view of constitutionally-prescribed democratic government as requiring complete per capita equality of representation
in the legislature has been popularly criticized on the ground that
it ignores the historical precedent of our federal legislative sys55 367 Mich. at 187, 116 N.W.2d at 354, quoting from Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich.
1, 7, 52 N.W. 944, 946 (1892).
56 367 Mich. at 189, 116 N.W.2d at 355.
57 Civil No. 9130, D. Okla., June 19, 1962.
58 The court's opinion is rather ambiguous as to whether "practical equality" of
representation is required under the fourteenth amendment. The opinion noted that
"while mere numerical disparity in voting strength is not, per se, invidiously discriminatory, it is, to be sure, cogent evidence of it and . . . may be sufficiently disproportionate
to constitute a prima fade showing." Id. at 5. The court further stated that its "guideline" in applying the equal protection clause would be the standard of the Oklahoma
constitution which makes "the principle of numerical equality . . . the rule, and any
Id. at 6. However, at the same time, the opinion
deviation . . . the exception .....
recognized the presence of "relevant countervailing factors, such as geography, economics,
mass media and functional or group voting strength." Ibid. Since no justifications were
offered for the numerical inequality in the Oklahoma apportionment, the court did not
have to consider precisely what weight would be given to such factors, although it did
note that they "could not overcome the basic principle underlying the right of an individual to cast an effective vote." Ibid. In the light of the vagueness of this opinion, it is
rather surprising to find that the final decree requires the legislature to be "reapportioned on the general principle of substantial numerical equality, to the end that each
voter shall have approximately the same power and influence in the election of the
members of the two houses." Pp. 2-3 of Final Decree. Moreover, the decree specifically
states that this order is based on the fourteenth amendment as well as the Oklahoma
constitution.
59 Moss v. Burkhart, Civil No. 9130, D. Okla., June 19, 1962, pp. 5-6.
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tem. 0 Certainly, it has been argued, it would be anomalous to
hold that the Constitution condemns a state's adoption of a bicameral legislature with one house apportioned essentially on the
basis of population 6 ' and the other apportioned with reference to
the representation of political subdivisions6 2 when that same Constitution adopted just such a legislative system, with substantial
numerical inequality of representation in the Federal Senate,
which has been accepted without question since its ratification. 3
Reliance upon the federal legislative system as a historical
precedent has, in turn, been sharply criticized, particularly by
commentators advocating the "practical equality" standard. The
essence of their argument against the "federal precedent" is
summed up in a single sentence: "the 13 original states created
the United States; the counties were created by the states." 65 The
states were independent sovereignties and could demand, right60 See Krock, Apportionment Test, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1962, § 4, p. 13, col. 1; Lewis,
Reapportionment Is Gaining Momentum, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1962, § 4, p. 8, cols. 1-5;
Hacker, Message on the State of the States, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1956, § 6 (Magazine),
pp. 15, 27, col. 4. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (dissenting opinion);
Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 215, 217-19, 116 N.W.2d 350, 368-70 (1962) (dissenting
opinion); BoYn, op. cit. supra note 41, at 4-5.
61 The House of Representatives is not apportioned strictly on population since each
state is guaranteed one representative regardless of its population. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Today, however, this affects only two seats out of the 435. Message of the President,
H.R. Doc. No. 46, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
62 In state legislatures following this pattern the representation by political units is
sometimes in the house of representatives while the senate is the branch apportioned
on a population basis. See, e.g., VT. CoNsr. ch. II, §§ 13, 14, 18. For the purposes of
this discussion, however, the legislative branch apportioned on a population standard will
be referred to as the "lower house" while the other branch will be described as the
"upper house."
63 See Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily Record,
July 2, 1962, p. 3, col. 4, Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962);
Memorandum opinion of the Special Master Part III, Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civil No.
3540, W.D. Wis., Aug. 3, 1962, p. 14. While the equal protection clause does not apply
to the federal government, a similar restriction upon governmental discrimination may
be imparted from the fifth amendment due process clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
The ratio of deviation in numerical representation in the federal Senate is greater than
that in most states. See, e.g., Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, supra.
A Senator from New York represents approximately seventy-four times as many people
as the Senator from Alaska. H.R. Doe. No. 46, supra note 61, at 2.
64 See, e.g., Tyler, What Is Representative Government?, New Republic, July 16, 1962,
pp. 15, 17; Editorial Comment, The Apportionment Revolution, 51 NATIONAL Civic RFv.
244 (1962); New Republic, June 11, 1962, p. 2. See also McKAY, RFAPPORTIONMENT AND
THE FEDERPAL ANALOGY

1-10 (1962).

65 Tyler, supra note 64, at 17.
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fully or not, 6 equal representation in the Senate as the price for
surrendering their sovereignty to a central government. On the
other hand, counties and other political subdivisions of the state
are not and never were regarded as sovereigns. They are, to the
contrary, mere creations of the state, subject to contraction, expansion, or dissolution almost at the whim of the state.07 They
have no special position by virtue of history which entitles them
to representation other than in accordance with the size of their
populace.68 Therefore, the argument concludes, the analogy of
the federal legislative system is both an "irrelevant and improper"
basis for judging the constitutionality of discrimination in state
legislative apportionment. 9
. In reply to this criticism, the question has been raised as to
how an institutional scheme may be rational if it is the product
of compromise between equal forces and arbitrary when it results
from a grant made within the discretion of the granting body.70
66 The senatorial apportionment has even been characterized by one advocate of
practical equality of representation as "a necessary evil, made historically imperative as
part of the price of union." Tyler, supra note 64, at 17. See also the original opinion
of Justice Black of the Michigan Supreme Court in Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 122-23,
104 N.W.2d 63, 126-27 (1960).
67 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
68 Opponents of the "federal analogy" contend that there is nothing inherent in the
concept of a bicameral legislature which prevents apportionment of both houses on a
population basis. The difference in the bases of representation in each branch which is
needed to provide a system of checks and balances can be obtained "by making one
house more numerous and the other less; by electing men to one house from smaller,
perhaps more homogenous districts .... " Tyler, supra note 64, at 18. See also McKAY,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 9-10. Many bicameral legislatures have been apportioned on
this basis. See, e.g., MIcn. CONsT. art. 5, §§ 2, 3 (1908). As of 1960, there were nine bicameral
legislatures in which both houses were required to be apportioned on a strict population
basis. BAKER, STATE CONsTrrTONS: REAPPORTIONMENT 5 (1960). Moreover, there were
twelve bicameral legislatures in which a population basis was legally required except that
each city, county, or other political subdivision was guaranteed a seat in one of the
legislative branches. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 25-27, Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It should be noted, however, that the concept of checks and
balances within the legislature is not so much an attribute of the concept of bicameralism
in itself as it is of the different bases of representation within the legislature. BAXER, op.
cit. supra, at 13. The same checks and balances could be provided in a unicameral
legislature if the seats were apportioned on two different bases. Cf. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26,
1962, p. 42, col. 5; Aug. 28, 1962, p. 6, col. 1.
69 Tyler, supra note 64, at 17, quoting Professor David of the University of Virginia.
70 See generally Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 222, 116 N.W. 350, 371 (1962) (dissenting opinion); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily
Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, cols. 3-6, Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct., afJd, 182 A.2d 877
(Md. 1962). Cf. Sanders v. Gray, 208 F. Supp. 158, 169 (N.D. Ga. 1962), making a similar
argument with respect to state election systems patterned after the Electoral College.
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Surely, it is argued, the numerical inequality in representation in
the Senate is considered to be based upon a rational classification
for reasons in addition to the fact that it was a political necessity
in 1789. This classification must be founded on the special functions performed by the states which entitle them to equal representation irrespective of their population. Political subdivisions,
such as counties, whether created by the state or not, perform
much the same functions within the state system as do the states
within the federal system.71 Therefore, the contravening argument continues, they rationally may be granted the same type of
representation in the state counterpart of the Senate. As one
court has put it, the "mere use of the word 'sovereignty' can[not]
as a practical matter sustain the Federal System and invalidate the
States." 72
This reply does not go far enough. Actually, both the popular
reliance upon the historical precedent of the Federal Senate to
attack the "practical equality" standard and the reply to that attack have missed the point. While the heated debate over the
validity of the "federal system" as a meaningful historical precedent has attracted much attention, the fact of the matter is that
the rejection of the "practical equality" standard does not rest on
that precedent as such. Actually, with one exception,73 the courts
refusing to accept the "practical equality" standard have not relied
upon the federal analogy to sustain their position.74 Neither have
71 But see Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of
Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 260 (1962).
72 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily Record, July

2, 1962, p. 3, col. 4, Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962).
73 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, supra note 72. Cf. Sanders v.
Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
74 See, e.g., Lisco v. McNichols, 31 U.S.L. Wrx 2107-08 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 1962);
Sims v. Frink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala. July 21, 1962; WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962); Sobel v. Adams, Civil No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla. Aug.
1962; Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp.
248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962); Levitt v. Maynard, 31
U.S.L. WEEK 2060 (Sup. Ct. N.H. July 16, 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
In most of these cases the court did not even mention the federal system and its possible
value as a precedent. The Sims court went farther, however, and explicitly rejected any
"federal analogy" on the grounds that it could not survive "the most superficial examination into the history of the requirement of the federal Constitution ... [or] a comparison
of the different political nature of states and counties." Sims v. Frink, supra, at 11. Two
members of the present Supreme Court have rejected the reliance upon the federal
system as a precedent indicative of what constitutes valid state apportionment, but it
seems likely that they will favor the "practical equality" standard. See MacDougall v.
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they insisted that the sole alternative to "practical equality" would
be a duplication of the federal system, with one house based essentially upon population and the other based upon representation
of political subdivisions. These courts have not looked to the
historical sanctity of the federal system as such, but rather to the
underlying considerations which support the utilization of that
system irrespective of the peculiar circumstances of its adoption.
The satisfactory operation of Congress serves to illustrate the general rationality of a system of apportionment which gives some
weight (although not necessarily the same as in the federal system)
to factors other than population (including, but not limited to,
representation of political subdivisions).
B. Rational Deviations From Equality
To date, the overwhelming majority of courts which have dealt
with contested apportionment schemes in the wake of the Baker
decision have given consideration to factors other than population
in determining whether numerical inequalities in representation
constitute "invidious discrimination" or "rational classification." 7
In general, these courts have adopted an equal protection standard which may be described briefly as emphasizing practical equality, but permitting certain so-called "rational deviations" from
such equality.76 As this description indicates, the standard does
not totally discard the one man-one vote concept. On the contrary per capita equality of representation is considered "the
starting point in determining the constitutionality of any apportionment" since it is one of the "fundamental ideals of American life.177 Any "serious departure" from apportionment according to population is automatically "subject to question" and
Green, 335 U.S. 281, 287-89 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Black and Murphy). See also Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 241 (1962).
See cases cited supra notes 73 and 74.
76 This standard was first developed in the argument of the Solicitor General in
Baker. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 25-36, Baker v. Car, 369
US. 186 (1962). See also Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.BA.J. 711, 712 (1962).
77 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 25, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). See also Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241, 249 (Idaho 1962); Maryland Comm. for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, col. 3, Anne
Arundel County Cir. Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962) (quoting the Solicitor General's
argument); see the earlier opinion of the Maryland case at 180 A.2d 656, 668 (1962).
75
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renders the apportionment unconstitutional unless it is shown to
have a "rational justification." 78 Even an otherwise "rational jus-

tification," however, will not warrant deviations from numerical
equality of representation that are found to be "too extreme."' 9
Obviously, one problem in determining the significance of a
standard permitting some numerical inequality in representation
beyond that necessitated by the practicalities of apportionment lies
in ascertaining what constitutes a "rational justification" for such
an inequality. The Solicitor General, who first introduced the
"rational deviations" standard in the Government's amicus curiae
brief in the Baker case,80 suggested that the following considerations might constitute justifiable non-population bases for representation: "The claims of historically separate units such as towns
and counties to have equal recognition, the desirability of distributing political power geographically, the need to prevent a single
large city or two from dominating the state," and possibly the
share of the state's costs which are paid by the various election districts.8 ' In addition, it has been suggested that even the desire
to protect certain minority economic interests may justify a departure from numerical equality.8 2 Most of these "factors" have
already been accepted by the courts and there are indications the
others will be accepted. 8
78 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 25, Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). See Sims v. Frink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962; Sweeney v. Notte,
183 A. 2d 296 (R.I. 1962). A significant departure from the "practical equality" standard
has been viewed as establishing "a prima facie case of invidious discrimination" shifting
the burden to the defendants "to show that there exists some rational basis for these
[numerical] disparities [in representation]." Lisco v. McNichols, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2107-08
[Civil No. 7501, p. 14] (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 1962).
79 See Cox, supra note 76, at 712. See generally the cases cited in notes 74 and 75

supra and the text at notes 90-95 infra.
80 See note 76 supra.
81 Cox, supra note 76,

at 712. For another list, see Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 346
(1962) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan).
82 See Lisco v. McNichols, 31 U.S.L. WEK 2107-08 (D. Colo., Aug. 10, 1962); Sobel v.
Adams, Civil No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962, pp. 10-11; Baker v. Canr, 369 U.S. 186,
346-47 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
83 See Baker v. Car, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345, 347 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), recognizing as
"rational" the representation of political units and/or geographical area, and the distribution of political power between the urban and rural population; Lisco v. McNichols, supra
note 82, recognizing as a relevant factor representation of certain industrial interests;
Sobel v. Adams, supra note 82, at 10-11, recognizing as a relevant consideration the representation of general regional interests; Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241, 248-49 (Idaho
1962), recognizing as rational the protection of sparsely settled areas; Levitt v. Maynard,
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Numerous reasons have been advanced to justify these considerations as providing "rational" bases for apportioning a legislature s4 In general, these reasons are founded upon the concept
of granting special political security to minorities, particularly the
inhabitants of the more remote and sparsely populated sections
of a state. The deficiencies of an apportionment scheme based
predominantly on population in preserving the legitimate interests of the sparsely populated areas-even to the point of creating
districts so spacious that legislators are not readily accessible to
their constituencies-have been recognized by the courts.85 Consequently, partial reliance upon the factors suggested by the Solicitor
General in apportioning state legislatures has been justified as
necessary to achieve the ideal of a government which maintains a
responsiveness to the will of its constituency as a whole, without
a "loss of responsiveness to lesser voices, reflecting smaller bodies
of opinion, in areas that constitute their own legitimate concern." 86
The difficulty with a "rational deviations" standard lies not
so much in defining the "rational" justifications for departure
from numerical equality in representation as it does in determining how far the departures resting upon these justifications may
be carried. 7 The Government, in its brief in Baker, seemed to
31 U.S.L. W= 2060 (Sup. Ct. N.H. July 16, 1962), recognizing as "rational" the proportion
of the total taxes paid by a district. See also cases cited in note 74 supra.
84 See, e.g., the various arguments offered by Judge Duckett of the Circuit Court of
Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his two opinions in Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2587 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. May 24, 1962);
id. Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, cols. 4-5. See also Sobel v. Adams, Civil No.
182-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962, pp. 6-8; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp.
25-36, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Bickel, The Great Apportionment Case, New
Republic, April 9, 1962, p. 13.
85 See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WEvx 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962);

Sobel v. Adams, supra note 84; Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241, 248-49 (Idaho 1962). But
see McKAY op. cit. supra note 64, at 8, arguing that the only proper protection of minorities against being "unreasonably disadvantaged" by the majority is the "constitutional
protection in bills of rights."
86 Bickel, supra note 84, at 14, quoting from Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National

Government, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 543 (1954).
87 The objective in drawing such a line, of course, is to prevent this preservation of

the "responsiveness to lesser voices" from overshadowing the basic objective of responsiveness to the population as a whole. Deviation from "practical equality" of representation
cannot reach the point where the legislative voice preserved to insure representation of
the views of minority interest is, in fact, more powerful than that of the majority. The
egalitarian philosophy of the "one man-one vote" concept is then not merely tempered,
but destroyed.
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suggest that the outer limits of the permissible inequality should
be determined to some extent by the nature of the considerations
relied upon to justify the inequality."" Thus, for example, the
desire to provide each municipality a representative in one house
might justify some small departures from per capita equality but
not a "substantial departure" because, inter alia, the justification
for municipal representation has lost much of its force since local
governments have lost their "historic separation and importance"
as governmental entities.8 9 Contrary to this approach, the courts
have tended to set the outer limits of numerical inequality in the
abstract without regard to the particular considerations which
might be relied upon as a justification for such inequality. They
have looked at the problem from the viewpoint of how much
equality of representation there must be despite any "rational
justification" rather than to what extent inequality may be warranted by a particulartype of justification 0
In drawing the outer limit in this manner, the courts have, as
one might expect, varied considerably in their conclusions. Some
courts have suggested that so long as apportionment in one house
of a bicameral legislature is based primarily upon numerical
equality of representation, the other house may be apportioned on
any "rational" basisY1 One court,92 while accepting this suggestion
generally, has imposed upon it an interesting condition. In the
lower house, which was, according to the state constitution, to be
apportioned upon the basis of population, the court refused to
accept even so slight a departure from that basis as the assignment of a representative to counties and groups of counties which
had only two-thirds of the population ideally to be represented
by each legislator, although the two-thirds principle was considered a "rational" means of protecting the interests of sparsely set88 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 30-35, Baker v. Carr, 369 US.

186 (1962).
89 Id. at 33. Protection of rural minorities, on the other hand, might permit a greater
departure. See Id. at 29-30.
90 See, e.g., Sims v. Frink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962, pp. 11-13;
Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962; Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp.
248, 257 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
91 See, e.g., Toombs v. Fortson, supra note 90, at 257; Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962, p. 3, col. 3, Anne Arundel
County Cir. Ct., aff'd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962).
92 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
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tied areas and therefore might be used in the upper house. 3
Still another court suggested that neither house must be strictly
apportioned upon a population basis, but "representation according to population to some extent must be required in both Houses
if invidious discrimination in the legislative systems as a whole is
'
to be avoided."94
Here, the scope of "some extent" was not defined but it would appear to require apportionment based essentially upon population with a possible deviation resulting from a
provision distributing perhaps one-third of the seats in both houses
upon a rational non-population basis 5 Along similar lines, the
suggestion has also been made that one house must be apportioned
entirely on population while the other must be apportioned substantially on population."6 Finally, one court's opinion, while not
dealing with both legislative houses, suggested that considerations
such as the representation of political units or regional interests
might be used to justify departures from a population standard
in both houses, but that such departures could not produce more
than a two-to-one disparity in individual voting power 9 -- the same
standard applied by the Michigan court under a "practical equality" of representation test.98
More revealing than the results the courts have reached, how93 Id. at 345-50.
94

Sims v. Frink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962, p. 13. The Sims court

also seemed willing to accept a bicameral legislature in which one house was apportioned
solely on population and the other house was apportioned on another "rational" basis. Ibid.
95 The court appeared to accept a lower house in which sixty-seven of the 106 seats
were reserved on a one-per-county basis and the remainder were apportioned according
to population. Id. at 11-13. See also N.Y. Times, July 22, 1962, p. 1, col. 2; p. 46, col. 5.
But, with so great a departure from per capita equality of representation in the lower
house, it found unacceptable an upper house apportioned completely on a non-population basis.
96 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 30, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), suggesting that, while it may be permissible to apportion one house of the
legislature so that rural areas with 30% of the population control 51% of the seats, the
other house would have to be apportioned strictly on a population basis. See also Cox,
supra note 76, at 712.
97 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962). The court states that any disparity of
four-to-one or greater in numerical representation constitutes "invidious discrimination."
In establishing guidelines for legislative action, however, it suggested an apportionment which would limit disparity to a two-to-one ratio. Id. at 301. While the decision was
limited to apportionment of the lower house, the court appeared somewhat skeptical of
the suggestion that the apportionment of the upper house might be "grossly discriminatory" so long as the lower house were apportioned "so as to conform reasonably to population." Id. at 302.
98 See text at notes 50-54 supra.
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ever, is the manner in which they have reached them. Many courts
have justified their conclusions by little more than a reference to
the phrase "invidious discrimination," as though that phrase had
in itself some intrinsic quantitative meaningY9 Typical is the
following comment by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island:
"The attorney general contends, and petitioners concede, that
apportionment along geographical, county, municipal or urban versus rural lines does not necessarily constitute a denial
of equal protection if the rationale of such methods can be
justified. We are in full accord with such contention, but it
is equally true that historical recourse to such apportionment
formulae cannot be justified if it results in invidious discrimination. The dilution of the vote of a majority of electors to
one fourth of that enjoyed by others is, in our opinion, so
unjust as to be invidiously discriminatory."' 00
Why the four-to-one ratio was suggested rather than a five-to-one
or three-to-one ratio remains hidden within the judgment of the
court.101

Other, more venturesome courts have attempted to spell out
the justification for the particular outer limit of numerical inequality in representation which they have imposed. 0 2 Even here,
however, some confusion seems to exist. Thus, one court has stated
that the constitutionality of an apportionment scheme must be
determined by a consideration of the following factors: (1) whether
the state policy is "rational," (2) whether the apportionment system is "arbitrary," (3)whether the "present complexion of the legislature has a historical basis in our political institutions, either
federal or state," and (4) whether there lies within the state electorate any remedy for gross inequalities of representation such as
99 See, e.g., Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 30 U.S.L. WEEK
2587 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. May 24, 1962); Levitt v. Attorney Gen., 179 A,2d
286, 291, petition for rehearing denied, 180 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1962) (using "rational basis"
the way other courts used "invidious discrimination'); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296,
301 (R.I. 1962).
100 Sweeney v. Notte, supra note 99, at 101.
101 Actually the court later suggested a system of apportionment which would produce
no more than a two-to-one ratio. See note 97 supra.
102 See Sims v. Frink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962, p. 8; Toombs v.
Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 254-58 (N.D. Ga. 1962). See also Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp.
158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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a provision for initiative and referendum. 03 The distinction between the first and second factors is not altogether clear. They
would appear to be merely opposite sides of the same coin-if the
state lacks a "rational basis" for apportionment then the resulting
system should be arbitrary and vice versa. Moreover, stated either
way, neither factor is very helpful in itself without some explanation of what constitutes "arbitrariness" or "rationality." The third
and fourth factors, one would gather, are aimed at providing this
explanation. With respect to them, the question may be asked as
to whether the availability of political means to alter legislative
apportionment goes to the issue of the constitutionality of the apportionment or the issue of whether a court should grant relief
even if a denial of equal protection is shown. Mr. Justice Clark,
who relied upon the unavailability of legal remedies in his separate opinion in the Baker case, seems to treat it as a factor going
only to the availability of relief.'0
C.

Rationality Without More

The judicial discussions of what considerations are relevant
in determining the maximum inequality of representation permissible under a "rational deviations" standard point up what is
probably the basic flaw in that standard, and for that matter, in
a "practical equality" standard as well. Why must legislative apportionment be based predominantly on population, if not solely
on population, in order to meet the requirements of the fourteenth
amendment? On what grounds have courts assumed that inequalities in numerical representation based on otherwise "rational"
factors constitute "invidious discrimination" when so great as to
subordinate population as the controlling basis for apportionment?
Why should not inequalities in numerical representation be justified as based on a "rational" classification even where population
is given no greater weight in the apportionment scheme than the
several other factors mentioned by the Solicitor General?
Any attempt to answer these questions must begin with an
analysis of the process by which courts determine the validity of
103 Toombs v. Fortson, supra note 102, at 254-56.
104 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 251-52 (1962) (concurring opinion of Justice Clark).

Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 32-33, Baker v. Carr, 369 US.

186 (1962).
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legislative discrimination under the equal protection clause. Certainly the customary judicial definition of equal protection in
terms of "rational classification" and "invidious discrimination"105
both hardly self-defining phrases- reveals little of this process.
Somewhat more descriptive is the suggestion of the majority opinion in Baker that the equal protection provision is aimed at discrimination which "reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action."'08 Though difficult at times, one can usually
determine whether legislative discrimination is founded upon a
"policy," a product of reasoning as opposed to whim and caprice,
by the presence in the discrimination of a definite program of
variant legislative treatment of persons or groups of persons according to some relevant difference in their composition. Unfortunately, however, the definition of equal protection suggested by
Baker is only half complete. Discrimination may be based upon
a reasoned policy, yet be considered "irrational" and therefore unconstitutional. For example, assume that a state legislature composed entirely of octogenarians passes a law prohibiting citizens
under eighty years of age from running for public office because
such candidates would be able to campaign with a youthful vigor
which the incumbents could not match. Surely the discrimination
in such a hypothetical case would be predicated upon a reasoned
policy and surely also it would not be constitutionally valid. For
the legislature must not only have a reason for discriminating, but
it must be, as Justice Brandeis once stated, a reason "which an
informed, intelligent, just-minded, civilized man could rationally
favor."' 01 Of course, what will so impress the civilized man will
105 But see Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 254 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1962), which cites
the dictionary definition of "arbitrary" in support of its conclusion that the Georgia
apportionment fit that category; Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168 n.9 (N.D. Ga.
1962) (doing the same with the dictionary definition of "invidious'). Actually, while the
phrases are used interchangeably by the courts, they do have different connotations. The
term "invidious" suggests more of an insertion of the personal viewpoint of the decisionmaker. The phrase "invidious discrimination" has been popularized in large part by
Justice Douglas. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244, 245 (1962) (concurring opinion);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,
278, 281 (1950); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
108 369 U.S. at 226. See text at note 11 supra.
107 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
This opinion contains probably the most complete judicial description of the application
of the equal protection clause: "[T]he equality clause requires merely that the classification shall be reasonable. We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent,
just-minded, civilized man could rationally favor. In passing upon legislation assailed
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depend in the end upon the values of his civilization. While the
range of "rationality" is broad, it necessarily is limited by the basic
value system within which it operates. Where the policy advanced
to justify a discrimination violates a basic tenet of that system,
it will necessarily be rejected as "irrational."'108 Thus, when the
hypothetical legislators discriminated against younger men solely
to preserve their own positions, the use of public power for a
private purpose would be contrary to a most fundamental postulate of government in our democratic society, and the discrimination therefore would be considered unconscionably arbitrary.
Using the more conventional terminology of equal protection, a
court might find that the basis for the discrimination here does
not bear a "real and substantial relation to the subject of the legislation,"' 1 9 or more accurately, that while the discrimination is
under the equality clause we have declared that the classification must rest upon a difference which is real, as distinguished from one which is seeming, specious, or fanciful,
so that all actually situated similarly will be treated alike; that the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of a purpose or the promotion of a policy, which is
within the permissible functions of the State; and that the difference must bear a
relation to the object of the legislation which is substantial, as distinguished from one
which is speculative, remote or negligible." Id. at 406.
108 See ibid. See also Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962). This
definition of "rationality" of classification seems equally applicable to discriminations
interfering with economic or personal liberties. Thus, the Court has verbalized the equal
protection test in the same manner in cases involving both types of liberties, and has
relied upon decisions involving economic restrictions in opinions dealing with personal
restrictions, and vice versa. Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 540-41 (1942), with Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). However,
there probably are more fundamental values relating to personal liberties with which the
policy justifications for a particular discrimination must be consistent; hence, inequalities
in that area are more likely to be held unconstitutional.
109 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928). This phraseology
is derived from one of the most frequently cited "rules" of the equal protection clause:
a classification to be legal must "rest upon distinctions having a fair and substantial
relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation." Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59 (1915). See Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (collecting cases). By insisting that the classification be explainable
in terms of the policy behind the legislation this rule would seem to be aimed primarily at ensuring that the classification does not represent a capricious drawing of
statutory lines without any particular reason for doing so. As applied, however, its
function is much broader. In determining whether a particular basis for classification is
related to a statutory policy, the Court refuses to consider any possible legislative purposes which, though based on reason, would be contrary to the basic principles which
limit the scope of governmental power. See, e-g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562 (1949), and Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1909), as explained in Allied
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, supra at 530 (concurring opinion). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). It is only in rare cases, however,
that the Court gives explicit recognition to the fact that this approach has been
adopted. See note 110 infra.
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based upon a reasoned classification, "the object of the classification ...is the promotion of a policy which is [not] within the
permissible functions of the State."'10 If, on the other hand, the
same type of discrimination were justified on a policy consistent
with our fundamental values, it would be upheld as based upon
a "rational classification," even if such policy were contrary to
lesser, more transitory values subscribed to by the contemporary
community."' Thus, if the hypothetical legislature required that
all candidates for office be at least twenty-one years old so as to
insure a minimum degree of experience and maturity in legislators,
the discrimination against minors would be upheld as based upon
"rational" grounds even though public opinion favors equal opportunity for all citizens irrespective of their age and maturity.
What makes the discrimination reasonable in this case and arbitrary in the other is not the distinction between a policy justification and no policy justification, but between justifications consistent
and inconsistent with those fundamental conceptions of the object
of government which our society has continuously accepted.
The application of this approach in determining the rationality
of the alleged justifications for discrimination requires some deference to the judgment of the legislature, which by the very nature of its position should be appreciative of our fundamental
values." 2 Even more significant is the place of history in determining "rationality"; for the continued survival of a practice over
a lengthy period of time is some evidence in itself that the practice
is not contrary to our basic values." 3 Finally, the Constitution,
110 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
See also Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122, 124-25 (1920); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915). Although this determination is discussed in the context of applying the equal protection clause, it is, perhaps, more basically an aspect of due process
rather than equal protection. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Rast
v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342, 358 (1916). However, in view of the overlapping
coverage of the two clauses, this distinction is without significance for our purposes
here. See Boiling v. Sharpe, supra.
1 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961).
112 See generally Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
11S See Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.
Supp. 158, 169 (N.D. Ga. 1962). See generally Kotch v. Board of River Boat Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 US. 552 (1947). Of course, this refers only to the historical practice
which has survived as a result of general acceptance by the public. Moreover, the
historical acceptance of a practice, while highly relevant, is not itself determinative
of constitutional validity. Other considerations may indicate that a policy is contrary
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as the guiding framework of our government, serves in itself as
the most significant indicator of our basic values, particularly insofar as the government and its relation to the individual is concerned.
In the light of this analysis of the process of determining "rationality," can it be said that apportionment based on factors
other than numerically equal representation of the population
violates the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment? Certainly representation according to political subdivisions,
geographical regions, or functional divisions in the population,
both economic and demographic, is generally the product of a
reasoned policy based upon actual differences in the interests represented." 4 But can it be maintained that such representation is
contrary to some fundamental principle inherent in our governmental system? To sustain this position, one must discard much
of our national history, not to mention our English heritage."'
We have had more than a few state governments in which population was a minor or completely absent factor in determining
representation.'" Ownership of real property was once thought
to be so important that it was the primary basis for allocating
representation in some states. 17 Yet, in reply, it may be argued
to our basic values even though it has had some widespread acceptance over a long
period of history. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114 See DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 205-07, 241-58 (1951) (outlining such policies
and their historical development); DeGrazia, General Theory of Apportionment, 17
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 256-62 (1952). Accordingly these factors are entitled to be characterized as "reasoned" even though they may still be "arbitrary" in terms of the equal
protection clause because the policy "justifying" their use contradicts some fundamental
value of our political system.
115 On the English attitude toward representation on a population basis, see the
material collected by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 302-04
(1962) (dissenting opinion). See also DeGrazia, General Theory of Apportionment, 17
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 256, 258-59 (1952), describing generally the historical use of
criteria other than population in apportionment.
116 Many early colonial legislatures were apportioned strictly on a geographical basis.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 309-10 (1962). This tradition has been carried on in many
states. In Maryland, for example, population did not become a factor in apportioning
either house until 1851. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d
656, 672 (Md. 1962) (dissenting opinion). And even after population was considered
in the apportionment scheme, it often was a comparatively minor factor. See, e.g., Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 161-63 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (describing the history of the
Georgia county unit system). See also Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 93-100, 104 N.W.2d
63 (1960).
117 See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also the comment of
DeGrazia, supra note 115, at 259: "In the American Constitutional Convention of 1787,
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that our system of values with respect to the individual and his
relationship to the government should not be determined in the
light of archaic and often abandoned state practices. Rather the
"rationality" of non-population bases for apportionment should
be judged against the values suggested by the objectives of our
revolution and, more significantly, of the constitutional "revolution" subsequent to the Civil War which produced the fourteenth, 118 fifteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth amendments.
The basic dilemma presented by this argument lies in the
nature of the inquiry itself. Regardless of whether one concludes
that numerical equality of representation is or is not one of the
few fundamental values of our system, that determination must
revolve about an interpretation of the leading constitutional evidence of our values with respect to the form of state governments,
article IV, section 4, of the Constitution, which guarantees to the
states a "republican" form of government. 19 It is in the light of
the requirement of a "republican" form of government that the
essentiality of per capita equality of representation must be judged.
If reasoned, non-population bases for apportioning state legislatures are considered "irrational," it is only because the concept of
republican form of government, possibly as supplemented by historical practice and other parts of the Constitution, requires a
representative democracy based upon complete political equality
of the individual. 20 That an interpretation of the constitutional
meaning of a "republican form of government" is the key to a
position requiring primary emphasis upon numerical equality of
representation is clearly illustrated by the fact that most of the
courts which have attempted to justify that position have emphasized that it was an attribute of that guarantee. 21 ' The argument
consideration was given to the possibility of allocating representation according to the

taxes paid by a state, but, partly because tax-paying areas were believed to coincide with
areas of high population density, population was chosen as the basis for representation."
118 The reference here is to the second section of the fourteenth amendment rather
than the more well-known first section. See generally McKAY, REAPPORTIONM NT AND
THE FEDERAL ANALoGY 6-7 (1962).
119 "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.
U. S. CoNsr.
art. IV, § 4.
120 See generally Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky 141, 160, 100 S.W. 865, 869 (1907);
State ex rel. Harte v. Moorhead, 99 Neb. 527, 536-39, 156 N.W. 1067, 1070-71 (1916);
DeGrazia, supra note 115, at 256-57, 261.
121 See, e.g., text at note 59 supra, quoting from Moss v. Burkhart, Civil No. 9130,
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which they have advanced, although not always clearly, is that a
"republican" form of government requires a popular democracy; 'that this, in turn, presupposes an equality of the individual and,
hence, of his voting power; and that, therefore, legislative representation on bases other than population is inconsistent with our
political system, although it may be very reasonable for other, nonrepublican forms of government. It is this argument and only this
argument which will justify a standard of "practical equality" of
representation or practical equality with some "rational deviations" as the standard for judging the constitutionality of legislative apportionment. The difficulty with the argument is that it
must start with an interpretation of the concept of a "republican"
form of government, and that, presumably, is not permitted.
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to interpret this
clause on the ground that questions involving the interpretation
of the "republican form of government" provision are non-justiciable "political" questions. Whether properly or not, the Court has
refused in Luther v. Borden123 and various other decisions 12 to

answer the precise question presented here: what is the nature of
our representative democracy in terms of the distribution of power
among the populace or, phrased differently, to what degree must
the majority control the government through either the legislative
representatives or some other governmental device?125 The majorD. Okla., June 19, 1962, pp. 5-6; id. at Appendix III; Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp.
248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), where the court states at 256, "the State statute . . . offends what
are found to be fundamental political concepts inherent in a republican form of government . . . and . . . must be stricken because of discrimination so excessive as to
be invidious"; Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2587
(Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. May 24, 1962); id., Baltimore Daily Record, July 2, 1962,
p. 3, col. 5, af'cd, 182 A.2d 877 (Md. 1962). See also the authorities cited in note 122 infra.
122 See generally In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891); Jefferson, Letter to S.
Kercheval, 10 WRTNcs oF THOMAS JEFXFMSON 37, 38-41 (Ford ed. 1899); THE FEDERAISr,
No. 39, at 245 (Ford ed. 1898) (Madison).
123 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
124 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Marshall v. Dye,
231 U.S. 250 (1913); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See
also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962) (listing and describing the cases which
have followed Luther v. Borden). But cf. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891);
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
125 In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), for example, the question posed
was whether the "republican form of government" provision required that a majority
of the populace-including non-freeholders, ordinarily not allowed to vote-had an
"indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right" to adopt a new government when the
present government did not suit them. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 19-20. In Pacific States Tel.
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ity opinion in Baker indicated no willingness to depart from these
decisions; to the contrary, it specifically announced continued adherence to them. 126 Thus, since the use of reasoned, non-population
based factors in apportioning a legislature is "irrational" only if
contrary to the most fundamental societal values, and since to establish such values one must necessarily rely upon a definition of
"republican" form of government, it would seem that requiring a
complete or primary emphasis upon numerical equality of representation in legislative apportionment goes beyond the Baker decision, at least insofar as the Court purportedly continues to adhere
to its position that a "political" question determination is inherent
in an interpretation of this clause.m
At this point, the question might be raised as to whether there
is anything left to the equal protection clause in the apportionment
context. If the basic principle of popular democracy, as required
by a "republican" form of government, cannot be used to judge
the "rationality" of numerical inequalities in representation resulting from apportionment schemes based upon non-population
factors, can any system of apportionment result in the denial of
equal protection? For, aside from the concept of a governmental
framework which requires equality of individual representation,
cannot all major inequalities in per capita voting power be justified as based on factors, such as representation of regional interests
or political subdivisions, which constitute "rational" bases for numerical differences in legislative representation? These were essentially the questions asked of the majority by the dissenters in the
Baker case. 12 8 The Court's answer apparently was that equal protection standards can be applied to apportionment inequalities
without consideration of the "republican form of government"
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, supra note 124, the question posed was whether the "republican
form of government" provision limited the function of legislating solely to the legislature or whether legislation might also be adopted directly by a vote of the majority
of the populace, who may not be able to control the legislature. 223 U.S. at 120-25.
126 369 U.S. at 226-29. See Bonfield, Baker v. Car: New Light on the Constitutional
Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 247 (1962); Katzenbach,
Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REV. 829, 831 (1962).
127 See Bonfield, supra note 126, suggesting that Baker might lead the Court to change
its mind on the non-justiciability of claims based on the content of the "republican
form of government." See also Note, 15 VAND. L. REv. 985, 1004 (1962).
128 369 U.S. at 298-99.

HeinOnline -- 61 Mich. L. Rev. 137 1962-1963

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

clause and the political philosophy it imposes on our state governments.1 29
Unfortunately, the Court gave no explanation for this answer.
If it had given an explanation, it might have been along the following lines. First, the equal protection clause continues to require
some principled justification for different treatment of similar
groups. Second, even if such a ground is advanced, its "rationality"
can be judged against fundamental values of our society other than
our basic philosophy of political structure, values which do not
require an examination of the relationship of equality in representation to the "republican form of government" clause. Certainly
a legislature could not apportion a district so that each of the legislator's homes would constitute a separate election district, with
the remainder of the state constituting a single additional district.
Discrimination justified solely in terms of the legislators' selfinterest cannot be said to be a "rational" classification, regardless
of whether the "republican form of government" clause requires
popular democracy with total equality of representation. 30
Of course, as the nature of this example indicates, the equal
protection guarantee has less practical significance under this view
than it would under a view which, in the light of some egalitarian
philosophy found in the concept of a "republican form of government," would be insistent upon substantial per capita equality of
representation as the only "rational" basis for apportioning a legislature.The impact which the equal protection clause will have
when divorced from the implications of such a political philosophy
will depend upon the degree to which the Court will rely on the
presumption of constitutionality that requires it to assume "any
state of facts [which] reasonably may be conceived" to justify a
statutory discrimination.131 At least a few instances of unconstitu-

tional apportionment can be pictured, however, irrespective of the
weight placed on that presumption. One such apportionment could
be that involved in the Baker case itself.
The apportionment situation in Tennessee presented inequalities of representation, resulting from over fifty years of legislative
129 See 369 U.S. at 226, 228-29.
180 Even the dissenters in Baher apparently would accept this conclusion. Baker v.
Car, 369 U.S. 186, 335-37 (1962) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan).
131 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), and cases cited therein.
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inaction, which apparently could not readily be justified on any
ground. According to Mr. Justice Clark, apportionment of the
Tennessee legislature lacked consistency whether allegedly based
on population, equal representation of political units, protection of
rural or other minority interests, geography, or any other "rational" policy.13 2 In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan nevertheless insisted
that to find no "rational" basis in this legislative apportionment
was to ignore the Court's duty to assume any conceivable set of
circumstances which might justify the state's existing arrangement.
He suggested that the Court assume that what Mr. Justice Clark
described as a "crazy quilt" of election districts was actually a "rational" scheme based upon some compromise which balanced various geographical and demographical factors in varying portions.1 33
While Mr. Justice Harlan's suggestion may have merit in other
contexts, it is not convincing in the Tennessee situation. The Court
should not be required to assume some "rational" formula based
on the balancing of various factors where all the circumstances contradict its presence. 34 The relevant state constitutional provision
required reapportionment every ten years solely on the basis of
population' 35 -a command which had obviously not been obeyed. 3 6
In fact, the last legislative apportionment had occurred in 1901.137
132 369 U.S. at 254-57. This conclusion is supported by reference to both Justice
Clark's and Justice Harlan's formula for determining the degree of representation of
a particular district.
133 369 U.S, at 334-35, 337-38, 345-48.
134 See Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 462

(1937).
185 TENN. CoNsr. art. II, § 6.
136 The emphasis placed upon this factor does not constitute acceptance of petitioners' argument in Baker that the state was barred from advancing any "rational" basis
for the discrimination because any such justification would be contrary to the Tennessee
constitution. While tempting, that approach was properly rejected by Justice Frankfurter as flying in the face of the ruling in Nashville, C. & S.L. Ry. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362 (1940). [See 369 U.S. at 325-27.] There, the Court opinion (by Justice Frankfurter) found that a discrimination in the living law-the law as applied by enforcement
agencies-could not be rejected as "invidious" even though the written law of the state
forbade such discrimination. In Browning, however, the rational basis for the inequality
in the application of the law was self-evident. Furthermore, the discrimination was the
product of a systematic pattern of action which produced a constant distribution of
the inequality. Browning, therefore, does not preclude reliance upon the contrary direction of state law to show the lack of policy behind discrimination, where, as here,

not only is no "rational" basis evident upon the surface of the discrimination, but the
means of imposing the discrimination suggests that there never was such a basis.
137 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101-107, subsequently amended in 1962, Public Chapter

No. 1,Extraordinary session of 1962. See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345-47 (M.D.
Tenn. 1962).
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The inequalities in representation in Tennessee were not the product of any affirmative legislative action, but merely the result of
natural shifts in population accompanied by legislative inaction for
over a half of a century. In such circumstances, to suggest that the
Tennessee apportionment was the product of the application of
any formula based upon "rational" considerations is to overlook
reality. To the contrary, in such a situation one cannot but

assume that the only reason for the inequality in representation is
the legislature's desire not to "rock the boat"; 138 and this policy,

whether merely a product of natural legislative inertia or a reflective decision to preserve and entrench the incumbent's political
power, cannot "rationally" justify discrimination. Under these circumstances, the least that can be asked of the legislature is some
affirmative showing that inequalities in representation were based
on some reason other than the legislators' personal interests. Thus,
if the Tennessee legislature were to reapportion the state along lines
incorporating the same inequalities but based upon some "rational"
formula, even one resting ninety percent on representing geographical and regional interests and ten percent on population, the discrimination could arguably be justified as a "rational" classification; 189 but when those inequalities are presented as in the Baker
case, with no greater reason evident than the legislature's self-in140
terest, then the discrimination must be considered "invidious."'
138 Contrary to Justice Harlan's suggestion, this conclusion may be reached without
undermining the long-accepted rule that a court will not inquire into the personal
motives of the legislators. See 369 U.S. at 337; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810). This rule has never prevented the Court from determining the purpose of
the legislature as a body in passing legislation, and certainly that purpose may be
indicated by the effect of the legislation. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
341 (1960); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 175 (1959). For a much more complete
discussion of the difference between legislative purpose and legislators' motives, see
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 608-11 (5th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Brown, whose position was subsequently sustained on appeal), revzd, 364 U.S. 339
(1960).
139 As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that the same inequalities will be reenacted, even though they may be "justifiable" insofar as the equal protection clause
is concerned. In the past, the most serious numerical inequalities in apportionment
have been the product of legislative failures to reapportion to accommodate population
shifts rather than affirmative statutory provisions apportioning on the basis of non-population considerations. See Hacker, Message on the State of the States, N.Y. Times, July
22, 1962, § 6 (Magazine), pp. 15, 27, col. 4; Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1060 (1958).
140 Quite a few states may fall into this category. Twenty-seven have not reapportioned for a quarter-century or more, although most of them had at least one house
which was to be apportioned on the basis of population. Lewis, Decision on Reappor-
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When, unlike Tennessee, the legislature--or better yet, the
electorate-has taken affirmative action on apportionment, then
Mr. Justice Harlan's warning must be kept in mind. The courts
cannot expect that inequalities in representation will be clearly explained by some precise, mathematical formula which allocates
specific weight to the various factors considered in the apportionment. 141 "No finicky or exact conformity to abstract correlation is
required of legislation" by the equal protection clause. 142 This prin-

ciple may have been overlooked by the Supreme Court of Michigan in deciding the Scholle case. The majority opinions there
found that the apportionment of the state senatorial seats was made
"without any discernible or conceivable basis."'143 The rationale
offered in support of that conclusion is interesting to note.44 Since
the senatorial election districts contained vast differences in population and area, neither of these factors, according to the argument,
could be the basis of the apportionment. Similarly, since the districts were composed of from ten counties to less than one county,
certainly representation of political units could not be the basis of
the apportionment. Finally, since rural populations of the same
size represent different portions of the total electorate in their respective districts, the apportionment could not have been based on
a rural-urban distinction. 45 Therefore, the rationale concluded,
tionment Points Up Urban-Rural Struggle, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 4, p. 3, col. 2;
Lewis, supra note 139, at 1060-61. In such instances the natural shifts in population
usually will have produced a present scheme of apportionment without any "rational"
pattern. Of course, this may not always be the case. Possibly there may have been few
shifts in population in a particular state. Also, the shifts may have been so orderly
that the present apportionment follows a clear pattern based in part on non-population
factors, for example, balance between farm and urban areas. In most cases, however,
the situation will be the same as that in Tennessee.

141 Usually, of course, the legislature never gives any precise weight to the factors
it considers relevant in apportionment. Politics-and this includes legislative apportionment-is, after all, the art of compromise. The legislature is more likely to agree on
a general priority of factors than on a precise mathematical formula. There are exceptions, however. See, e.g., PROPOSED MxCH. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 2-6 (1962).
142 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420, 524 (1961) (concurring opinion).
143 See 367 Mich. at 242-43, 116 N.W.2d at 381 (concurring opinion of Justice Souris).
144 The opinion cited in note 143 supra contained no exposition of the rationale
used to support its conclusion. However, Justice Souris did cite the early opinion of
Justice Smith which included a detailed argument in support of the majority position.
See Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 42, 51-56, 104 N.W.2d 63, 84, 89-91 (1960). Perhaps
the clearest articulation of this rationale, however, is the oral argument of the Attorney
General of Michigan on behalf of the petitioners. See mimeographed reprint of Attorney
General's oral argument at pp. 4-5.
145 Even accepting the general approach of this rationale, comparison of the voting
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the apportionment must lack any reasoned basis. 4 6 Such an analysis
is much too inflexible for the application of a constitutional provision which is supposed to give the state extremely broad discretion.
Equal protection does not require the "logical tidiness' 4 7 for
which the Michigan court was apparently looking.
The same opinion which concluded that the Michigan apportionment had no conceivable basis also acknowledged that the result of the apportionment "gives the more sparsely populated rural
areas of the state a specific check upon the concentrated political
power of the densely populated industrial urban center."' 4 Why
couldn't this result of the apportionment be its basis? It was shown
that the apportionment had been presented to the electorate as
aimed precisely at achieving this result of giving the rural interests
a "check" upon the political influence of the large metropolitan
counties. 149 Might it not be maintained that the Michigan senatorial apportionment was based on a general plan in which population was a secondary factor, subordinated to the primary objective
of giving the sparsely populated counties sufficient weight within
their senatorial district so as to have a substantial voice in the election of its representative? Thus, the suggestion was made that the
apportionment of the thirty-four senate seats was generally based
on population, provided, as often was the case, that the resulting
districts would not be so large that a sparsely settled county would
strength of equal rural populations in different districts is not the proper test for

determining whether an apportionment scheme is designed to grant the rural minority
political security against the urban majority. Instead, the court should look to whether
the districts with higher percentage of rural population generally have less people
over-all. On this basis, the figures in Michigan would be more consistent with a ruralurban division. See 360 Mich. at 55 n.17, 104 N.W.2d at 91 n.17.
146 This approach is similar to that employed by the lower court in Baker v. Carr,
206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
147 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 524 (1961) (concurring opinion).
148 367 Mich. at 236, 116 N.W.2d at 378-79.
149 Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Supplemental and Reply Brief, pp. 53, 55, 59,
Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), rev'd on rehearing, 367 Mich. 176,
116 N.W. 350 (1962). The present Michigan apportionment provisions were adopted
at a general election in 1952. These provisions won out over another proposal on the
ballot which would have apportioned both houses of the legislature on a population
basis. The proponents of the victorious proposal clearly stated that its objective was
to prevent the heavily populated areas from controlling the upper as well as the lower
houses. This was commonly referred to as the "balanced legislature" plan. Election
statements explaining the objectives of the "balanced legislature" plan were presented
to the court through reference to various newspaper articles.
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contribute only a small portion of the district's total electorate. 5 '
And, in addition to this proviso, there might be found still a further exception to protect certain regional interests, such as that of
the state's northern peninsula. Whether or not the Michigan apportionment might reasonably be said to follow such a general plan
involves an analysis of geographical, demographical, and historical
facts which are beyond the scope of this discussion. The point is
that the Michigan court might well have kept its collective mind
open to the possibility of an apportionment scheme as suggested
above, rather than closed to everything except some mathematically precise formula. It should have been aware, as a federal district
court has recently noted, that apportionment may reasonably be
based on "factors adapted to [all] the needs of the state... constituted as it is of urban, suburban and rural areas, with congestion
of population in one spot, with areas of lesser intensity in other
locations and with sparsely settled spaces more remote from the
151
centers of population.
Of course, under the analysis suggested, once a court can reasonably conceive a general plan of apportionment based on "rational" factors, its tasks under the equal protection clause should
be at an end. It should not, as in the Scholle decision, reject all
bases for apportionment schemes other than population as arbitrary and therefore insist upon "practical equality" of representation. Neither should it, though most lower courts have done so,
permit the use of factors other than population only insofar as
population is still retained as the predominant factor. Both of these
approaches can be justified only on the basis of a fundamental
political value in our society which demands total equality of representation, and, as already noted, sustaining the presence of such
a fundamental concept necessarily involves the interpretation of
the "republican form of government" guaranteed to the states under article IV, section 4. Unless the Court is to reverse its position
in Luther v. Borden and the other cases dealing with that provision, the lower courts must be satisfied with the more limited function in these cases which is here suggested."1 2 They must, as one
150 See Supplemental Brief of Intervening Defendants, Brief of C. R. Coleman as
Amicus Curiae, Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
151 WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962).
152 However, while the judicial function under this analysis is considerably nar-
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lower court has recently done, accept numerical inequality in representation where apportionment is based not only partially, but
even predominantly on reasoned factors other than population. S
Finally, one further point should be mentioned. Regardless of
whether the Court adopts the more limited equal protection standard suggested here, a standard of "practical equality," or a standard
of practical equality with certain "rational deviations," the choice
hopefully should be made during the present term. The sooner the
legal uncertainty over the applicable standard in apportionment
cases is ended, the sooner the judges' role with respect to legislative
apportionment-whether it is narrow or broad-will become fully
effective. When the majority in Baker carefully avoided providing
any specific guidelines as to what constituted unconstitutional apportionment, it obviously was hopeful that its holding on the issue
of justiciability would be all that was needed to spur the state legislatures into reapportioning, possibly along lines much more egalitarian than required by the equal protection guarantee. 15 This
hope has not materialized. Most legislatures, even those where the
contested apportionment is clearly invalid under any view of equal
protection, have been unable, or at least unwilling, to achieve any
sort of reapportionment without a lower court decision holding the
present state apportionment invalid. 5 Moreover, even then some
legislatures have adopted the policy of making the minimum numrower than that suggested by many commentators, it still may have considerable
practical significance. See note 140 supra.
153 In Sobel v. Adams, Civil No. 186-62-M, S.D. Fla., Aug. 1962, the court accepted
as "rational" a proposed apportionment in which representation of political units was
the primary factor. The senate would consist of forty-six members. Each of the twentyfour most populous counties would receive one senator, and the remaining forty-three
counties would be divided into twenty-two districts of two or three counties apiece
which would elect the other twenty-two senators. The house of representatives would
consist of 135 members. Each of the sixty-six counties would be reserved one seat, and
the remaining seats would be distributed essentially on a population basis. See also
WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WEK 2121 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1962).
Justice Clark's opinion also indicates that an apportionment based on non-population
factors would be constitutionally valid. Thus, Justice Clark characterized the Georgia
county unit system, challenged in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), as based upon
"some rational policy." See 369 U.S. at 253 & n.4, 256 & n.8. The county unit system,
as described by Justice Clark, was "based . . . on a consistent combination of political
units and population, giving six unit votes to the eight most populous counties, four
unit votes to the 30 counties next in population, and two unit votes to each of the
remaining counties." Id. at 253 nA.
154 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5, 269, 339 (1962) (concurring and dissenting opinions); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 70-73, Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
155 As of October, only one state, Virginia, had apportioned its legislature since
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ber of changes necessary to present a bare facade of compliance
with the lower court's order, even though it is expected that such
changes may not be sufficient to meet that court's view of equal
protection. 15 6 This legislative reticence is attributable in part to an
unwillingness to make any significant changes until the meaning
of "invidious discrimination" in apportionment is dearly defined
by the courts. 15 7 Whether this is a proper excuse for inaction or
not, the fact remains that the absence of clear standards approved
by the Supreme Court serves as an open invitation-usually
accepted-to legislative refusals to seriously reconsider apportionment either on their own initiative or in response to lower court
decisions.
The legislatures' reluctance to act has not been the only undesirable by-product of the absence of a definitive interpretation
by the Supreme Court of the equal protection clause as it applies
to state legislative apportionment. In the light of the limited holding in the Baker case, lower courts, including an elected judiciary
in many states, 5 ' have been left almost entirely on their own in
determining when numerical inequalities in apportionment constitute "invidious discrimination." Elected state judges in particuthe Baker decision without the spur of a court decision. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 71,
cols. 1-5. See 51 NATIONAL Cmc REv. 441 (1962). Ten states have suggested constitutional
amendments, but most of these reflect the pressure of judicial decisions. And while

other states are considering reapportionment proposals, it seems unlikely that many
basic changes will be made until a court so orders. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 23,
col. 1; U.S. News & World Report, April 9, 1962, p. 53. But see N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
1962, p. 18, col. 3.
156 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1962, p. 33, cols. 4, 6; July 4, 1962, p. 9, col. 1; June 1,
1962, p. 1, col. 8; May 27, 1962, p. 57, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 12, 1962, p. 21,
col. 1. Thus, statutes passed in response to court orders were held invalid in Tennessee
and Alabama. See Sims v. Fink, Civil No. 1744-N, M.D. Ala., July 21, 1962; Baker

v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.). Tenn. 1962).

The Alabama provision, for example,

would not have made any changes until 1966. See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1962, p. 1,
col. 2; p. 46, col. 5.
157 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 2, 1962, p. 30, col. 1; June 11, 1962, p. 1, col. 4; p. 26,
col. 5; id., cols. 1-4. See also N.Y. Times, May 14, 1962, p. 28, col. 2; June 22, 1962,
p. 24, col. 2, in reply to this position. In Wisconsin, the combination of a legislature
and a governor of different political parties produced a stalemate which neither was
willing to break in the absence of a direct court order. See N.Y. Times, July 21, 1962,
p. 19, col. 1; July 18, 1962, p. 15, col. 4; July 12, 1962, p. 21, col. 1. The court order
never came, however, as the pending suit was dismissed upon the recommendation
of a special master. Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civil No. 3540, W.). Wis., Aug. 14, 1962.
158 Approximately one-half of the apportionment suits filed subsequent to Baker have
been in state courts. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, p. 23, col. 1; Reapportionment Efforts at
High Pitch, 51 NATIoNAL Cmvic REv. 441 (1962); Lewis, Reapportionment Is Gaining
Momentum, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1962, § 34, p. 8, col. 1.
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lar have thus been placed in an unnecessarily delicate political
position by the wide range of standards they may adopt without
directly contradicting the majority opinion in Baker.159 Almost
any decision they make will be subjected to charges of political
partisanship which could not be so readily raised if the courts'
choices of standards were clearly controlled by precedent. 160 The
unfortunate result may be direct judicial entry into the arena of
political debate, as was the case in Scholle. There the various
opinions were sprinkled with injudicious comments directed at
political opponents, 161 including a scarcely-veiled warning that the
majority opinion might go by the wayside if the "wrong" judges
were chosen in the upcoming election. 162 Hopefully, when the dust
settles and the Court has spelled out the applicable standards, the
restrictions of precedent will force injudicious judges to return to
the law and will spur legislatures to appropriate action to eliminate
arbitrariness in legislative apportionments.
159 Cf. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1962, p. 23, col. 3. The state courts' position has not
been made any easier by statements of state legal officers that the law is clearly one
way or another. In both Michigan and Wisconsin, the state Attorney General argued
against the validity of the state law. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1962, p. 24, col. 8; July 10,
1962, p. 23, col. 6; June 20, 1962, p. 20, col. 4; Supplemental Brief and Appendix of
Defendant Hare, pp. 1-3, Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962). The
position of the Attorney General in Michigan was that the unconstitutionality of the
Michigan constitution was so clear that his oath to support the federal constitution
prohibited him from defending the state law.
160 There are indications that criticisms of state court decisions in cases involving
legislative apportionment would be considerably more restrained if responsibility for
the decision might be attributed to the precedent of a Supreme Court decision. See,
e.g., the criticism of the Scholle decision in the Detroit News, July 19, 1962, p. 1, col. 5;
p. 11, cols. 1-2. Of course, even then, the state courts would still be "on their own"
when it came to prescribing the form of judicial relief from unconstitutional apportionment. See id. at p. 19, cols. 1-2.
101 Thus, a substantial portion of Justice Kavanaugh's opinion is directed at answering an alleged legislative "threat" of impeachment. In this connection, the opinion
goes out of its way to place the blame for the necessity of judicial action at the doorstep of veteran legislators (presumably of the opposing political party) who failed to
reapportion pursuant to the 1908 constitution. (Apparently Justice Kavanaugh believed
this failure was responsible for the affirmative vote in 1952 which replaced the 1908
provision with the present provision.) 367 Mich. at 176-82, 116 N.W.2d at 551-52.
Justice Black's opinion, as another example, seems to be aimed indirectly, if not directly, at the general judicial philosophy of Justice Dethmers. In particular, Justice
Black emphasizes Justice Dethmers' previous criticism of the Supreme Court in a speech
in 1958, although no reference to the speech or the ideas expressed therein are contained in the Dethmers dissent. 567 Mich. at 249-50, 116 N.W.2d at 384-85.
162 "To Dirksenize our judgment by telling the legislature that questioned sections
2 and 4 will be judged void, as soon as that body enacts validly under original sections 2 and 4, is to perpetuate an unconstitutional body for another 2 years (and
doubtless more years depending on the outcome of 4 Supreme Court elections scheduled
during the next 9 months)." 367 Mich. at 253, 116 N.W.2d at 387.
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